ECOWAS OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN MALI, BAMAKO,
29 APRIL 2007

FINAL REPORT - ECOWAS COMMISSION, BAMAKO 6 MAY 2007

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
A) Overview of Geography and Demography
B) Administrative Information
C) History and Recent Politics
D) Constitutional Organisation of State

III. CONTEXT

IV. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A) Preparatory Work of the Mission
B) Observation of Voting Process

V. ANALYSIS

VI AUDIENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

VII. PROVISIONAL RESULTS

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

IX. CONCLUSION

X. ANNEXES
· Geographical map of Republic of MALI
· Constitution
· Electoral Law
· Terms of Reference
· Administrative Note
· Deployment of Observer Team into Zones
· ECOWAS Observer Mission Reporting Forms
· List of polling Stations
· Provisional Election Results
· Preliminary Declaration by ECOWAS Observer Mission
· Press Release

INTRODUCTION

The President of ECOWAS Commission deployed an Observer Mission to Mali for the 29 April 2007 Presidential Election. This is in conformity with the provisions of Article 12 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the Supplementary Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security as well as the implementation of Decision A/DEC/19/01/03 of the 26th session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Dakar on 31st January 2003 which mandate the President of ECOWAS Commission to send to any member state holding elections a supervisory or observer mission to those elections, if he deems it necessary.

2. The sixty-member ECOWAS Observer Mission to the 29 April 2007 Presidential Election in the Republic of Mali was composed of delegations from member-states of ECOWAS, representatives of the ECOWAS Parliament and ECOWAS ambassadors accredited to Nigeria as well as electoral experts drawn from electoral management bodies and civil society organizations from the sub-region.

3. The Mission was led by H.E. Mr. Koffi SAMA, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Togo and coordinated by a technical support team from the ECOWAS Commission. The coordinating team from the ECOWAS Commission was headed by Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah, Conflict Prevention Adviser to the ECOWAS Commission.

4. The terms of reference of the Observer Mission were as follows:

I. To be in close contact with the competent authorities of the host country;

II. As may be necessary, to cooperate with other NGOs and observer missions, while still keeping the independence of the mission;

III. That member of the mission were to refrain from making any personal statement on the election. Every statement was to be the collective view of the mission and issued on behalf of the mission by the head of mission or a spokesperson designated for such a task;

IV. To forward a report to the President of the ECOWAS Commission addressing the following:

· Everything the mission had observed by themselves;

· All information gathered by the mission from witnesses;

· Its assessment of the election against the yardstick of national electoral laws and universally accepted electoral principles;

· Its recommendations on ways to improve future elections and observer missions in the sub region.

5. The report of the observer mission was to be signed by every member of the mission and submitted to the President of the ECOWAS by the Head of Mission within a period not later than fifteen (15) from the end of the mission.

II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON MALI
A. OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY
Mali, officially Republic of Mali, a landlocked West African Republic, is bordered on the north by Algeria, on the east by Niger, and Burkina Faso, on the south by Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, and on the West by Senegal, and Mauritania. Mali is a relatively large country with a surface area of 1,240,192 sq km (478,841 sq mi). This corresponds to a size a little over 30 times the size of Switzerland or the combined size of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. The distance between the North and the South of Mali is 1600 km. 65% of the Territory of Mali is covered by desert and it is one of the poorest countries of the world.
Most of Mali consists of low plains broken occasionally by rocky hills. In the south-east the Hombori Mountains rise to 1,155 m (3,789 ft), and in the south-west the Bambouk and Manding mountains are separated by an area of sandy lowlands north and north-west of the River Niger, which cuts an arc across Mali. The northern third of the country lies within the Sahara. In the west is a part of the Sahel, a semi-arid transitional zone between the savannah areas of the south and the Sahara desert to the north.
In 2006, the population of Mali was estimated at 11716829, giving an average population density of about 10 people per sq km (25 per sq mi). 90% of Malians live in the south of the country. Almost all the population of Mali is African; the major groups are the Bambara, Fulani, Tuareg, Soninké, Sénouf, Songhai, Malinké, and Dogon. Nomadic Tuaregs and other Berbers roam the Sahel and parts of the Sahara. 40% of Malians are Mandingos (mainly bambaras.) they live in the Wast of the country (Bamako). The Songhai inhabits the est and the Soninké live in the West; the Sénouf live around Sikasso, in the area bordering Burkina Faso and the Côte d’Ivoire. The Dogon are found further in the North east on the Bandiagara plateau. The Fulani inhabits the Manne arc while the Sahara is the domain of the Maures. the nomadic Touareg roam area between the Sahel and part of the Sahara down to the Sahelian banks of River Niger which cuts an arc across Mali.
Since independence from France, these later ethnic groups numbering about 400,000 have always opposed the political domination of the Mandingos. This has meant that for them the fixed international borders and their integration into a state environment in which they are marginalised is something they reluctantly accommodate.
In April 1992, a national peace agreement, the Bamako Accord, was reached between the Government and the main Touareg groups represented in the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawar (MFUA). The armed rebellion continued with smaller groups in the north of the country and in neighbouring Niger. Once the conflict was settled, the problem of creating an autonomous region for the Touareg continued.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Mali is divided into eight administrative regions, subdivided into cercles and arondissements, plus the capital district of Bamako. The larger towns have elected mayors and municipal council members. The main cities are Bamako, the capital, with a population of 1,083,000 (1999 estimate); Ségou, Sikasso, and Mopti, Ségou and Mopti are important fishing centres. Timbuktu (Tombouctou) is an important centre of religion and learning. In 2003, 32% of the Malians were urban dwellers.
French is the official language but African languages are normally spoken. The Mandingo languages-Bambara, Malinké and Dyula-as well as the Voltaic languages-Dogun, Senoufo-Songhai, Hassanya Arabic and two Berber language, Tamasheq and Tamajaq are widly spoken within different communities. Bambara tends to be used as the lingua franca.
Islam mixed with the traditional belief is the religion of about 90 per cent of the population, and about 9 per cent of the people follow traditional beliefs; about 1 per cent are Christians.
C. BRIEF HISTORY AND RECENT POLITICS
African political activity was banned by the French in Mali until after World War II. Various parties were formed, which eventually merged to form the Sudanese Union, which became the Malian section of the inter-territorial African Democratic Rally. By the time of the 1957 political reforms, the Sudanese Union was the main party.
In 1958 the French Sudan voted to join the new French Community, and it was proclaimed the Sudanese Republic on November 24, 1958. On January 17, 1959, it joined with Senegal to form the Federation of Mali, which proclaimed its independence on June 20, 1960, with Modibo Keita as its president. The federation broke up in September. Senegal became a separate state; the former French Sudan retained the name Mali and Keita remained the president of the new Republic of Mali, proclaimed on September 22, 1960. Later that same month the republic became a member of the UN. After independence, Mali pursued a policy of economic development along socialist lines.
The Traoré Regime
In November 1968 army officers overthrew the one-man rule of President Keita and established a military junta led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, who later assumed the presidency. His government, however, was unable to advance the economy appreciably, having to contend both with lack of capital and a famine-causing drought in the mid-1970s. An internal power struggle in 1978 led to an attempted coup. In the aftermath, several former members of the junta were tried and sentenced, while political unrest and repression spread.
President Traoré, running as the only candidate, was returned to office in 1979 and 1985. Mali was hard hit by the drought of the mid-1980s. A border war with Burkina Faso was halted by a ceasefire in late 1985. Under pressure from its creditors, Mali restructured its economy in the late 1980s to privatize unprofitable government enterprises. Traoré was overthrown in March 1991 by a group of army officers.
A new constitution providing for a multi-party republic was approved in January 1992. Legislative elections were held in March, resulting in victory for the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), which set up a coalition government with two smaller parties. Alpha Oumar Konaré, the ADEMA leader, became the first democratically elected president in April. An attempted coup by supporters of Traoré collapsed in December 1993.
Touareg Rebellion
From the late 1980s northern Mali was ridden by strife. Fighting broke out between the settled African population and the nomadic Touareg, and at the same time the region became involved in a general rebellion of Touareg demanding greater autonomy from the governments of Mali, Niger, and Algeria, whose borders cross traditional Touareg territory. In 1992 a peace agreement, the Bamako Accord, was reached with the main Touareg groups represented in the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawar (MFUA). Conflict continued with smaller groups into 1995.
In 1996 more than 2,000 Touareg former rebels were integrated into the regular army. The long conflict led to some 120,000 people becoming refugees; after November, 25,000 Malian Touareg refugees were repatriated from Niger.
The Konaré Regime
In May 1997 President Konaré was re-elected, and his ADEMA party returned to power following two rounds of legislative elections held, after several postponements, in July and August. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita resigned as prime minister in September, but was reappointed by President Konaré the following day. In the same month it was reported that Switzerland had agreed to return funds to Mali, amounting to some US$2.67 million, that had been embezzled and deposited by an anonymous associate of former president Moussá Traoré.
In January 1999, Traoré—already serving one prison sentence—his wife Mariam Cissoko, and his brother-in-law Abraham Cissoko, were sentenced to death after being found guilty on embezzlement charges. The sentences were commuted, in September, to life imprisonment and hard labour.
As tribal violence escalated in 1999, President Konaré announced, in November, that he would not run for the presidency in the election planned for 2002. A new prime minister, Mande Sidibe—formerly an official with the International Monetary Fund—was appointed after the resignation of Ibrahim Boukabar Keita, and formed his Cabinet in February 2000. In July, a fourth report was published which highlighted alleged corruption in government-owned companies and other public bodies. Presidential elections in May 2002 saw a substantial victory for Amadou Toumani Touré, leader of the March 1991 coup. Parliamentary elections followed in July, with Espoir 2002, a coalition of parties including the Rally for Mali, taking 66 of the 147 seats. The newly appointed prime minister is Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani.
The problems facing Konaré at the start of his presidency were nothing new: a bloated bureaucracy, protests by civil servants, trade unionists and students for better pay, conditions and guaranteed state employment after graduation, a large debt and a weak private sector. There was also the spectre of Moussa Traoré to deal with. The former dictator’s trial began in November 1992 and in February 1993 his was condemned to death for his role in the debt of 106 protestors in Bamako nearly two years earlier. Konaré commuted his sentence to life imprisonment in November 1997, but a second trial- this time for embezzlement- resulted in a second death sentence in January 1999. As a last gesture, only days before stepping down from his presidential seat in 2002, Konaré pardoned and liberated Traoré, which was very much in line with general public opinion.

The “Association des Elèves et des Etudiants du Mali (AEEM)” has become the most powerful and intransigent of the students interest groups which were demanding increase grants and improved conditions, and rioting in 1993 and 1994 brought down Konaré’s firsts two Prime Ministers, Younoussi Touré and Abdoulaye Sékou Sow (a 50% devaluation of the FCFA in January 1994 also contributed to Sow’s departure).

In February 1994 Ibrahim Boubakar Keita was appointed to the post and quickly gained a reputation as a “hawk”, arresting all of AEEM leaders and initiating rigoros post-devaluation austerity measures.
Presidential and legislative elections in 1997 secured Konaré a second five-year presidential term and confirmed ADEMA as Mali’s dominant political party. However, these elections were poorly organised and widely boycotted by opposition parties, marking the beginning of a political stalemate between ADEMA and the radical opposition, who organised themselves into the “Collectif des Partis de l’Opposition (COPPO)” in November 1997 and boycotted subsequent municipal elections in June 1998 and May and June 1999.

Despite Konaré’s internal problems- which were relatively trivial in the greatest scheme of African politics – his Government enjoyed a significant amount of good weal from western countries. Konaré proved to be a generally-co-operative leader, who made an effort to reform the economy and was, after all, one of Africa’s very few democratically elected leaders and even more so coming after a military leader who willingly handed over power to him.

During the 2002 presidential elections, Mali showed the world that it understood the meaning of democracy. In the first place, Konaré did not dispute the constitutionally determined limit of two full terms; his step down peacefully in May 2002. In the meantime, no less than 24 candidates had step forward as presidential candidates- one of whom was a woman. Eventually the filed narrowed down to two candidates: Soumaïla Cissé – Member of the ruling ADEMA Party and considered favourite and a surprising opposition candidate, former transitional President General Amadou Toumani Touré. The latter, affectionately called “ATT” by the Malians, had spent the ten years of Konaré‘s presidency working as a benefactor in the humanitarian sector, and he was highly appreciated for his integrity. His return to politics came as a surprise, opposition candidates, support groups and even incumbent President Konaré- despite belonging to the ADEMA Party-supported ATT. The former Head of State General Amadou Toumany Touré, who had led Mali in the 1991-1992 transition, won the 2002 presidential election. The popular outsider, whose lack of personal ambition had gained him the second nickname of ‘Soldier for democracy’, one 68% of the votes.

ATT started his term with powerful promises; he pledged to improve the economy and to promote social housing, education and jobs for the Youths. At the same time, he moved carefully, leaving most of Konaré’s government intact and aiming to unit the Malian people in a politically stable environment. It was ATT’s decision to implement strict IMF-supported reform programmes that caused the first backlash in the otherwise calm waters of the political system. However, two years down the road with ATT, the Malian economy surprisingly performed well, despite difficult circumstances. Even though unemployment still soared, about 35.000 jobs for the youth were actually created while the housing programme yielded success with new residential areas popping up around Bamako and other towns.

Outsiders claimed that ATT would soon loose the popularity he has gained during Konaté’s presidency. However, they were proved wrong, as ATT continued to enjoy the support of the majority of Malians. Internationally, in September 2003 he earned a high standing for Mali’s contribution to the liberation of 14 Europeans hostages who have been held captive by terrorists in Algeria. There after, the IMF continued to praise and support Mali’s social and economic reforms.
The new President who had no political party (and therefore no parliamentary majority) and his Government brought on board people from all political parties of the country. ATT had a tremendous amount of work to do in a country where 64 % of the population lived under the poverty line and 21 % in extreme poverty. However he took advantage of his five year mandate to translate into action his promise of alternative government.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF STATE POWER
Until 1991, Mali was governed under a constitution drawn up in 1974 and made effective, with amendments, in 1979. Elected twice without opposition, President Moussa Traoré ruled from 1969 as a dictator, and from 1979 through the nation’s sole legal political party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People, founded in 1979. After a coup in March 1991 deposed Traoré, this party was dissolved.
A new constitution, approved by popular referendum in January 1992, established Mali as a multi-party republic with a president directly elected to a five-year term. There is a maximum of two terms for any President. The president appoints the prime minister, who is the head of the government and he selects the other members of the council of ministers. Mali is divided into eight administrative regions, sub divided into cercles (circles) and arrondissement (districts) plus the Capital district of Bamako, the major cities elected mayors and municipal councils. Bamako has a governor as Head Office Administration. Each cercle is administered by a “commandant” and each arrondissement is “headed” by a chief of the district.
The separation of powers is enshrined in the fundamental law of the land-the Constitution. Legislative power resides in the National Assembly. The unicameral National Assembly consists of 120 deputies elected to five-year terms; 13 seats in the assembly are reserved to represent the interests of Malians abroad. Article 81 of the constitution stipulates that “the power of the Judiciary in independent of the Legislative and the Executive”.
III. CONTEXT
For more than a decade, African countries in general and those in West Africa in particular have been involved in a renewal of democratic process. Also, in some of these countries, great efforts are underway to organise free, credible and transparent elections. Mali, a member state of ECOWAS had April 2007 as deadline for general election inline with the Supplementary Protocol on the Maintenance of Peace and the Prevention of Conflicts signed in 1999 and its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance signed in 2001, ECOWAS has set itself the mission of assisting member state which seems to organise free and transparent elections, this assistance may take the form of technical assistance, political mediation, financial assistance, assistance in equipment or any other assistance which may help the requesting state to organise the election within the rules set in the above mentioned protocols. A justification for an ECOWAS Exploratory Mission despatched to Mali was the fact that the democratic process under way in that country needed to be reinforced as in several other countries in the sub region. Since Mali is one of the countries in the sub region well known for its peaceful democratic transition it was important that democratic gains needed to be preserved there. It is for this reason that the President of the ECOWAS Commission dispatched a four-member pre-election Exploratory Mission to Mali on 24 March 2007. The Mission was led by Mr. Amirou Garba Sidikou, Secretary General of the Association of Traditional Chiefs of Niger who is also a member of the ECOWAS Council of the Wise. Other members of the mission were the former Chairman of the Autonomous Electoral Commission of the Benin, the Head of Zone 2 bureau based in Burkina Faso and Electoral Programme Assistance Officer of ECOWAS.
The goal of this Exploratory Mission was to make sure that the impending election of Mali was been prepared in condition of peace and transparency in Mali.
· The Stakes

Since 2002, the date of the first election which brought into office President Amadou Toumani Touré, the Political consensus which has prevail in Mali seems to be given way to a state of an easy disquiet: there also seems to be no real political opposition. This has come about because all the major parties have one time or the other be represented in the government of the President’s movement led by Prime Minister Issoufou Maiga.

This had some implications for the 29 April 2007 Election such that divergent attitudes could play out: a scission of l’ADEMA gave birth to Convergence 2007 and to the candidature of Soumeyloy Boubey Maiga.

Ibrahim Boubakar Keita, president of the national Assembly and leader of RPM, who has always shown independent tendencies of opinion and action also declared his candidature nd this was predicted.

Tiebile Drame, one of the foremost leader ATT, implied a malicious outburst during the Franco-African Summit in Bamako that he had become a victim of a plot and so was quitting the president Camp and also announced it candidature.

In view of the above mentioned, it became obvious that some of the consequences of the presidential election would be that political consensus risked being fragmented. One could expect a return to the classical scheme of things where the majority which governs is confronted by uncompromising opposition which opposes within the framework of laws and regulations and which knows its rights. To this end, it was important that the parties which were still in alliance with the President had to redouble their dynamism and show some prove of their independent if there were to survive credible puplic opinion: in effect it could not be rolled out that the Citizens’ Movement which is the principal spot of H.E. President Touré with it own social agenda. An so the parties in alliance with the President could show him open support while still being critical of President Touré so as to secure their future.

To all intents and purposes, when a President relies simply on his popularity and charisma to govern without a political party it is a sure replica for disaster. This case is similar to previous scenario which swept the President to power. As that time as it is now the political culture prevailing was that he was God sent; but this has weaken the role of political parties in respect of the population’s aspirations.

In the cause of the Mission’s stay in Mali form 24 March to 2 April 2007, the delegation met different key stakeholders of the electoral process.

The Mission evaluated the state of preparations towards elections and during it stay, the mission noted a number of key issues notably:
- The general atmosphere prevailing the country
- The voter database and voter ID cards
- The voters register
- Institutions regulating communication
- Incumbency and the abusive use of State Power

· The General Atmosphere
This pre-electoral register was characterised by a lurking anxiety regarding the pending election which people looked forward to with happiness. The leaders of political parties as well as those of civil society did not hesitate to predict the breakout of violence if the election takes place with guarantees of transparency and a change in the noticeable illegal behaviour of the Malian authorities. It was in the same vein that the Bishop Conference of Mali published a letter entitled “and how are we restoring Politics? In this letter they regretted the practical decline of morals and called on the political class once again seize the opportunity. On their part, Muslim leaders many times prayed and preached in the mosque for avoidance of violence with this mentality prevailing, several questions were raised touching on the following points:

- The voter data-base and voter ID cards.
Seven million and two hundred thousand voter ID cards had been printed when there was a total of 6.884.524 voters. In spite of the clarification by the General Directorate on Election (DGE), the majority of candidates and their supporters denounced the discrepancy between the number of voter id card printed and the number of actual voters and suspected that it smacked of preparation for massive fraud.
The opposition’s informal request for a audit of voter data-base had not yet received a positive response. These suspicions were aggravated by the fact that the electoral database at the time the mission was in Mali, was inaccessible to the contesting candidates and political parties.

- voters register
The peculiarity of Mali is a that citizen may, according to electoral law vote only if his or her name is the voter’s register even without presenting his or her voter ID or National ID Cards, in such cases it is enough for the voter to present two witnesses to confirm his or her identity. Many of the political actors deplored this fact and very earlier on questioned the value of the voter ID cards.

- Organs Regulating the Media
It is peculiar to Mali that there are two organs responsible for regulating the media. On the one hand, there is the Superior Council for Communication which regulates the private media and on the other, the National Committee for Equal Access of Malians to the State Media. While there are those who holds the view that the duality organs is ok if the political will exist to truly regulate the media, a strong majority denounced this duality and called for only one organ to exercise the power of sanction.

- The Organisation and Supervision of Elections
While the CENI is tasked to supervised and monitor elections, the ministry for territorial Administration organises the material and technical aspects of the elections. Between this two organs, there is also the General Directorate for Elections (DGE) which theoretically is an independent organisation and whose regular task are: the elaboration and management of Election Data-base, the designing and printing of voters ID Cards as well as financing political parties.
The case against the DGE was that they had printed ID cards without photos nor fingerprints; this was at variance with transparency and adequate security of the electoral process. There were those who believed that the juxtaposition of these three structures contributed to complicating the procedures more than simplifying them.

- The Abusive Use of Incumbency
For critics of government, the use of incumbency was clear in relation to the media (especially the ORTM) and that the incumbent presidential camp profited in the absence of a clearly spelt out re-election timetable. Government however, argued that its action were necessary because it had to show the population its achievement in the name of the continuity of the state. The opposition however insisted that the law clearly allows for equal access to the state media for all contestant at all stages for the electoral process.
Certain candidates also denounced the other use of means of state such as vehicles, a budgetary allocation for the anticipated campaign these bitter criticisms were addressed to the top functionaries of the territorial administration and to certain army officers who took part in the political debate and this even one sympathetic support in the presidential camp. On their part, the Presidential camp refuted this allegation and held to their view that all their actions was in the name of the continuity of the state. Arising out of the all the above mentioned, the exploratory mission made the following recommendations to ECOWAS”

a. Giving the constraint of time, it was not possible to send a second mission to Mali and therefore ECOWAS must maintain contact with the Malian key stakeholders and in so doing, to call for the maintenance of peace.
b. Do a daily monitoring report on the situation in Mali
c. Taking into account the key political and social stakeholders regarding the scheduled 29 April 2007 Presidential Election in Mali, to send in good time a preparatory team to adequately prepare for the eventual deployment of ECOWAS ina vast country such as Mali
d. To initiate a programme of translation of all constitution and the fundamental texts regarding election in member state into the three official working languages of ECOWAS to facilitate the work of observers and the work of various ECOWAS missions.

IV. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A. Preparatory Work of Mission
On receipt of the report of exploratory mission, the President of ECOWAS Commission dispatched an ECOWAS Coordinating team to Bamako on 18 April 2007, to prepare the ground for the deployment of an observer Mission and to hold further consultations.

ECOWAS observers started to arrive in Bamako on 25 April 2007. For the purpose of coordination and security, ECOWAS Observers were accommodated at Azalai Nord-Sud and Massaley Hotels.

In line with the plan of deployment, the work of the Mission comprised the following phases:
- 25 to 27 April 2007: Arrival of observers
- 26 April 2007: Briefing by coordinating team on the plan of the deployment of the observers, accommodation, transportation, communication, health and financial matters.
- 27 April 2007: Departure of observer teams detailed for far away Regions (Mopti, Toumbouctou, Gao and Kidal) to sleep overnight.
- 28 April 2007: Departure of observer teams deployed in nearby regions (Koulikoro, Segou, Sikasso and Kayes).
- 29 April 2007: Observation of the voting and counting process in Regions and District of Bamako.
- 30 April to 1 May 2007: Observers return to base.
- 30 April 2007: Debriefing of observers and press conference addressed by the Head of Mission on ECOWAS preliminary declaration at the Azalai Nord-Sud Hotel.
- 1 to 3 May 2007: discussions and analysis of evaluation reports
- 2 to 5 May 2007: Departures

Each team was provided with a kit which included a sim card, extra rechargeable units and a first aid box.

B. Observation of the Voting Process:
Observations on Election Day

Following an initial assessment of the field reports by the teams deployed countrywide, the ECOWAS Observer Mission made the following observations on the voting of 29 April 2007:

1. Opening of Polling Stations

· The mission observed that most polling stations opened at 8:00 a.m. or within thirty (30) minutes of the stipulated time.

· Election officials, agents of candidates and CENI as well as personnel of the security agencies were at post when polling stations opened.

· In addition, ECOWAS observers noted the presence of representatives of the Constitutional Court.

· Voters’ ID cards, which had not yet been claimed by their owners, were available for collection at the various polling stations.

2. Electoral Materials

· Sufficient electoral material was already at the polling stations for the commencement of business.

· The display of the voters’ registers at the entrance of polling stations facilitated the identification of polling stations by voters.

· The use of substandard seals did not make the ballot boxes sufficiently secure.

· The polling booths guaranteed the secrecy of the vote. Indelible ink, official stamps, ballot papers and the back-up voters’ register were all available.

3. Atmosphere and Security

· The atmosphere at the polling stations was calm and peaceful. The mission teams did not observe any violation concerning the display of propaganda material at polling stations, including the display of posters and notices, wearing of T-Shirts and effigies of candidates.

· Adequate security measures were put in place to ensure the good conduct of the election. The presence of adequate and in most cases non-intrusive security personnel was also noted.

4. Participation and Conduct of Voters

· In the Bamako District, voter turn out was relatively lower than what was recorded in the regions.

· The mission noted the remarkable participation of women, the youth, the aged and the physically challenged.

· Voting took place in an orderly and disciplined manner.

5. The Voting Process

· On the average, three to five agents of the candidates were present at the polling stations.

· National and international observers were present.

· The use of a single-sheet ballot paper helped simplify the voting process and facilitated the smooth flow of voting.

· The presence of minors deployed as electoral assistants and the inadequate training of electoral officials and agents of candidates in some cases affected the efficiency and quality of the voting process.

· The ballot boxes were not sufficiently secured in certain polling stations.

· Some agents of candidates were not sufficiently vigilant in monitoring the voting process.

· Some isolated cases of multiple voting or attempts at it were recorded, especially in Gao and at Sokorodji in the Bamako District.

· In addition, for reasons related to inadequate training, there was a high incidence of invalid ballot papers recorded across the country.

6. Closing and Compilation of Results

· Most of the polling stations complied with the official closing time of 6pm.

· ECOWAS Observer teams did not notice voters waiting in queues to cast their ballot at 6pm.

· The absence of light in some areas made the counting and compilation somehow cumbersome.
· Also, because appropriate methods were not used in the sorting, counting and consolidation of votes, the operation became complicated even though this did not affect the results obtained.

· Declaration forms were completed in accordance with the electoral law.

· In some polling stations, inadequate security accompanied the transfer of ballot boxes to collation centres.

V ANALYSIS

From the observations of the ECOWAS machine there were number of different kind of difficulties these centred around:

· The security of ballot boxes in the polling station as well as the transfer of ballot boxes to the collation centres. Both of these need to be improved.
· The lack of adequate training at all levels:

- Representatives of various stakeholders at the polling station and the electoral officers displayed a lack of adequate knowledge and professionalism at the polling stations. They could not play their different roles well.

- Many of the electorate lost their vote because they did not know how to correctly thumbprint the ballot paper (multiple thumb printing of thumb printing on the photograph of candidates) several methods of training and sensitisation needed to have been used

- During the counting and consolidation of the ballots at the close of voting, a considerable amount of time was somehow lost due to the absence of appropriate method of counting and consolidation of ballots.

· The presence of minors as election officers and party representatives and underaged voters born in 1989 but who did not know their exact date of birth

- There were isolated cases of multiple voting and the fraudulent retention of some voters ID cards.

· Even though the turnout was variable in the regions, it was generally low country wide. The Malian authorities, political parties, civil society and the media could be said to have all contributed to this low turnout
In spite of the above mentioned problem, it could be said that the overall organisation of the 29 April 2007 presidential election was satisfactory this is evidenced by:

· With a few exceptions most polling station opened on time
· The party representative and the election officers generally did their work correctly at the polling station and even those who were absent were replaced
· Electoral material were functional; however improvement could be made in the quality of the polling booth and the seals for ballot boxes
· The atmosphere was peaceful, thanks to the maturity of the Malian people. The presence of heavily armed security personnel in some places sometimes gave an exceptional character to an exercise which is normal in the life of a nation.

VI. AUDIENCE WITH H.E. THE PRESIDENT

On Tuesday, 1st May 2007 at 11am, a delegation of ECOWAS Observer Mission led by H.E. M. Koffi Sama, former Prime Minster of Togo, was received in audience by H.E. President Amadou Toumani Touré

In the course of this interaction, matters raised in the preliminary declaration of the ECOWAS Observer Mission were discussed and a copy of the said declaration presented to H.E. the President the delegation sized the opportunity to congratulate the Malian people for the maturity they had demonstrated during the April 29 2007 poll.

VII. PROVISIONAL RESULTS: ( see Annex)

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Following from the observations made on the voting procedures on Election Day, 29 April 2007, the Observer Mission recommends that for future elections the Malian authorities should:

· Improve upon the security of the ballot boxes and ballot papers with the view to minimising the risks of manipulation and fraud by:

o Using only ballot paper which are serialised;
o Using more efficient and trust worthy seals which must also be serialised
o Announcing to all those persons authorised to be in the polling station, serial numbers of the seals before the seals are broken and electoral materials removed from the ballot boxes, before the start of voting
o Announcing the number of available ballot papers at the polling station before voting begins and also after voting ends
o Making the preceding officer to take into account all unused ballot paper during the consolidation of results
o Ensuring that at the close of the voting all materials used for the voting should be placed back into the ballot box and at least three credible serialised seals must be used to secure the ballot box; when the box is closed, the numbers of the seals must be announced publicly before the ballot boxes are transferred to higher structures for collation;

o Ensuring that the transfer of ballot boxes to the consolidation centres by election official must be accompanied not only by security personnel by also representatives of parties and candidates and all those authorised persons who observe the voting process at the polling stations

· Regarding the improvement of the Management and Control of the Ballot, ECOWAS further recommend to the authorities that they should:
o Disallow any one without an identity card from voting so as to avoid multiple voting fraud
o Improve the system of voter identification by introducing voter ID cards with photograph
o Impress upon to change the voting hours taking into account climatic conditions and lack of sufficient lighting;

· Regarding Capacity Building, ECOWAS also recommends to the Malian authorities that they should:
ü Pay particular attention to training election officials and other persons authorised to be in the polling station.

ü Provide the means to improve on the capacity of the representative of parties and candidates within the framework of control, monitoring of the process, the counting, consolidation and declaration of results;

ü Encouraged to reinforce sensitisation and civic education of the population and give support to political parties for the same purpose.

· Furthermore, concerning consensus building ECOWAS urges the authorities to:

ü Encouraged to put in place a permanent mechanism for inter-stakeholder consultations which would give all concerned stakeholders (Political Parties, Civil Society, Electoral Management Body) so as to restore continuing dialogue and maintain the spirit of democracy

ü Encouraged to empower the national committee responsible to equal right to the public media to play a fuller role in organising the sharing of airtime in media state, before, during and after electioneering campaigns

The Observer Mission also made some recommendation to ECOWAS. It calls on ECOWAS to:

· Speed up the harmonisation of election assistance and processes within the West African space by:

ü Ensuring that Parliaments, Civl Society Organisations, the Media as well as decentralised structures in the sub region take advantage of the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in relation to elections.

ü Creating a network of Election Management Bodies in member states.

ü Speeding up the setting up of a bank of electoral material which could be put at the disposal of any member state which organises elections.

ü Improving future material conditions for observation to reinforce the feasibility, quality and prestige of ECOWAS Observer Missions.

VII. CONCLUSION

The observer mission discerned a willingness and determination of the competent Malian authorities to organise a peaceful and transparent election.

The mission notes that despite some shortcomings, the Presidential election of 29 April 2007 has been free, fair and credible.

ECOWAS will continue to follow the electoral process to its logical conclusion.

ECOWAS congratulates all stakeholders for their contribution towards ensuring an atmosphere of peace and tolerance, which afforded citizens the opportunity to freely express their will.

ECOWAS salutes the Malian people for the demonstration of discipline and maturity in the course of this exercise.

ECOWAS expresses its appreciation for the remarkable attempt made by the Malian people to consolidate their democratic gains, in the spirit of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

ECOWAS exhorts all candidates and their supporters to continue to play their part in consolidating peace by diligently following the legal and constitutional provisions in the electoral law till the end of the process.