| ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DES ETATS DE L’AFRIQUE DE
L’OUEST
Mission d’Observation de l’Election
au Cap Vert
Praia, 10 – 15 février 2006
RAPPORT FINAL - Secrétariat Exécutif Praia,
février 2006
SOMMAIRE
I. INTRODUCTION
II. INFORMATIONS GENERALES SUR LE CAP VERT
A. Aperçu géographique et démographique
B. Informations administratives
C. Histoire et politique récente
D. Organisation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs publics
III. DEROULEMENT DE LA MISSION D’OBSERVATION
A. Préparation de la mission
B. Observation du scrutin
C. Les résultats globaux provisoires
IV. OBSERVATIONS-ANALYSES
V. RECOMMANDATIONS
VI . CONCLUSION
VII . ANNEXES
· Carte géographique du Cap Vert
· Constitution
· Code électoral
· Termes de référence
· Répartition des équipes d’observateurs
par région
· Formulaires d’observation
· Liste des bureaux de vote observés
· Résultats provisoires de l’élection
· Communiqué de l’observation internationale
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Conformément aux dispositions de l’article
12 du Protocole sur la Démocratie et la Bonne Gouvernance,
additionnel au Protocole relatif au Mécanisme de
Prévention, de Gestion, de Règlement des
Conflits, de Maintien de la Paix et de la Sécurité,
et en exécution de la Décision A/DEC.19/01/03
de la vingt-sixième session de la Conférence
des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement, tenue à
Dakar le 31 janvier 2003, qui stipule qu’à
la demande de tout Etat membre, le Secrétaire Exécutif
peut envoyer dans le pays concerné, une mission
de supervision ou d’observation des élections,
le Secrétariat Exécutif de la CEDEAO a déployé
seize (16) observateurs au Cap Vert à l’occasion
du scrutin de l’élection présidentielle
du 12 février 2006.
2. La Mission d’Observation de la CEDEAO est constituée
de ressortissants des Etats membres, du personnel du Secrétariat
Exécutif, des membres du Conseil des Sages et des
observateurs formés au Centre International de
Maintien de la Paix Kofi Annan, basé à Accra.
3. La Mission est conduite par Monsieur Pedro A. Godinho
GOMES, membre du Conseil des Sages. La coordination de
la Mission a été assurée par le Dr.
Abdel-Fatau MUSAH, du Secrétariat Exécutif.
4. Les termes de référence de la Mission
d’Observation sont indiqués ci-après
:
(i) Tenir des réunions avec les Autorités
compétentes du pays hôte aux fins d’échanges
et de détermination des modalités de déploiement
des observateurs dans l’Etat membre.
(ii) En tant que de besoin, coopérer avec les
ONG et toutes autres missions d’observation tout
en conservant son autonomie.
(iii) Les membres de la Mission sont tenus à une
obligation de réserve et doivent s’abstenir
de toute déclaration individuelle. Toute déclaration
est collective et faite au nom de la Mission par le Chef
de Mission ou un porte-parole désigné à
cet effet.
(iv) Faire rapport au Secrétaire Exécutif.
Ledit rapport doit obligatoirement comporter :
· tout ce que la Mission a pu constater par elle-même
;
· ce qu’elle a recueilli par témoignage
;
· son appréciation sur le déroulement
du vote par rapport, d’une part, aux lois nationales
s’appliquant aux élections, d’autre
part, aux principes universellement admis en matière
électorale ;
· ses recommandations aux fins d’amélioration
des élections à venir et de missions d’observation.
(v) Le Rapport de la Mission d’Observation devra
être signé par tous les membres de la Mission
et soumis au Secrétaire Exécutif par le
Chef de la Mission dans un délai de quinze (15)
jours au plus tard à compter de la fin de la Mission.
II. INFORMATIONS GENERALES SUR LE CAP VERT
A. Aperçu géographique et démographique
5. Le Cap-Vert (en portugais: Cabo Verde) est un petit
pays insulaire de 4033 km² situé dans l'océan
Atlantique, à plus de 600 km au large du Sénégal,
la pointe la plus occidentale de l'Afrique. L'archipel
est constitué de dix îles et de cinq îlots.
Au nord, les Îles-du-Vent (Ilhas de Barlavento)
comprennent Santo Antão, São Vicente, São
Nicolao, Sal et Boa Vista. Au sud, São Tiago (ou
Santiago regroupant la moitié de la population),
Brava, Fogo et Maio forment les Îles-sous-le-Vent
(Ilhas de Sotavento). La capitale du Cap-Vert est Praia
(île de São Tiago). Administrativement, le
Cap-Vert est formé de 17 districts ou concelhos:
Boa Vista, Brava, Calheta, Maio, Mosteiros, Paul, Praia,
Porto Novo, Ribeira Grande, Sal, Santa Catarina, Santa
Cruz, São Domingos, São Nicolau, São
Filipe, São Vicente et Tarrafal.
6. La population capverdienne est majoritairement issue
d'un mélange d'Africains et d'Européens,
avec 80 % de Métis ou Mestiços, les descendants
des anciens esclaves africains et des colonisateurs européens;
les Blancs ne représentent que 2 % de la population.
La moitié des Capverdiens est concentrée
sur l'île de São Tiago et l'île de
São Vicente (voir le tableau ci-dessous).
Île Population Superficie
Santo Antão 43 845 779 km2
São Vicente 67 163 227 km2
São Nicolau 13 661 346 km2
Sal 14 816 216 km2
Boa Vista 4 209 620 km2
São Tiago 56 082 991 km2
Maio 6 754 269 km2
Fogo 17 582 476 km2
Brava 6 804 64 km2
Santa Luzia Inhabitée 35 km2
7. Suite à diverses vagues d'émigrations,
plus de 700 000 Capverdiens vivent aujourd'hui à
l'étranger, surtout aux États-Unis (250
000), au Canada, au Portugal, en France, en Espagne, en
Italie, aux Pays-Bas, en Guinée-Bissau, au Sénégal,
en Angola, etc. Marquée par cinq siècles
de présence portugaise, la population capverdienne,
d’environ 434 625, est majoritairement catholique
(95 %).
B. Histoire et politique récente
8. Il est probable que les îles du Cap-Vert étaient
inhabitées lorsque les Portugais y accostèrent
en 1456. Cependant, il n'est pas certain que ce soit vraiment
les Portugais qui les aient découvertes. Des historiens
croient que cette découverte est plutôt due
à des navigateurs vénitiens et génois.
On sait aussi que ces îles furent fréquentées
depuis longtemps par des pêcheurs sénégalais.
Une colonie portugaise
9. C'est en 1460 que le navigateur, Diogo Gomes, prit
possession de l'archipel au nom du Portugal, qui devint
domaine de la Couronne, après que les droits portugais
sur les îles eurent été consacrés
par le traité de Tordesillas, en 1494.
10. En 1951, à l'instar des autres possessions
portugaises, le Cap-Vert devint un territoire d'outre-mer.
Cinq ans plus tard, en septembre 1956, Amilcar Cabral,
un ingénieur agronome d’origine Capverdien
mais formé à l'université de Lisbonne,
fonda le Parti africain pour l'indépendance de
la Guinée portugaise (future Guinée-Bissau)
et du Cap-Vert (PAIGC). À partir de 1959, il s'engagea
dans la lutte armée contre le colonisateur portugais.
Le mouvement prit une orientation nationaliste révolutionnaire
et marxisante qui s'accentua en janvier 1973. La guérilla
réussit à contrôler les deux tiers
de la Guinée-Bissau, alors qu'au Cap-Vert le mouvement
resta clandestin.
L'indépendance du Cap-Vert
11. En 1975, après la révolution des Œillets
au Portugal, le Cap-Vert et la Guinée-Bissau (l'ancienne
colonie portugaise la plus proche) accédèrent
à l'indépendance et constituèrent
deux États indépendants lies par un parti
et un programme communs
12. Les deux anciennes colonies portugaises se séparèrent
lors du coup d'État du 14 novembre 1980 en Guinée-Bissau.
En 1990, le Partido Africano da Independência de
Cabo Verde, le PAICV (ou Parti pour l'indépendance
du Cap-Vert) accepta d’organiser des élections
libres, persuadé de les remporter. Toutefois, les
élections démocratiques du 13 janvier 1991
furent remportées par le Mouvement pour la démocratie
(Movimento para a Democracia, MPD), le premier parti d'opposition.
Le 17 février 1991, Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro
fut élu président de la République.
En 1996, de nouvelles élections furent encore remportées
par le MPD. L’alternance démocratique s’est
installée: le PAICV a remporté les élections
législatives de 2001 et de 2006 et Pedro Pires
fut élu président de la République
en 2001 et selon les résultats provisoires de l’élection
présidentielle du 12 février 2006, Pedro
Pires a été reconduit.
D. Organisation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs publics
13. Le Cap Vert est une République souveraine,
unitaire et démocratique qui s’organise en
Etat de droit. Les organes de la souveraineté sont
: le Président de la République, l’Assemblée
Nationale, le Gouvernement, et les Tribunaux.
§ L’Exécutif
14. Le Président de la République est le
garant de l’unité de la Nation et de l’Etat,
de l’intégrité du territoire, de l’indépendance
nationale et veille à l’application de la
Constitution et des traités internationaux. Le
Président de la République est élu
pour une période de cinq ans.
15. Le Gouvernement est l’organe qui défini,
dirige et exécute la politique générale
interne et externe du pays et est l’organe supérieur
de l’Administration Publique. Il est politiquement
responsable devant l’assemblée nationale.
Le Gouvernement est compose par le Premier Ministre, les
Ministres et les Secrétaires d’Etat.
§ Le Législatif
16. L’Assemblée Nationale représente
tous les citoyens du Cap Vert.
§ Le Judiciaire
17. La justice est administrée au nom du peuple
par les tribunaux et par les organes non juridictionnels
crée par la Constitution et la loi.
§ Autres organes
18. Les organes de l’Etat comprennent également
l’existence des collectivités locales.
III. DEROULEMENT DE LA MISSION D’OBSERVATION
A. Préparation de la mission
19. Une note administrative, un plan de déploiement,
des fiches d’observation et d’autres documents
ont été préparés à
l’attention des observateurs.
20. La note administrative comprenait entre autres, la
prise en charge des activités logistiques ci-après
au profit des observateurs:
§ l'hébergement ;
§ le transport ;
§ les moyens de communications;
§ la santé;
§ les finances.
21. Pour des raisons de coordination et de sécurité,
tous les observateurs ont été logés
dans les hôtels Felicidade et Praia Maria avant
leur déploiement sur le terrain et à l'issue
du scrutin. Une salle de réunion a été
aménagée dans les locaux de l'hôtel
Felicidad pour coordonner les différentes activités.
22. Conformément au plan de déploiement,
l'exécution de la mission a comporté cinq
(5) phases:
§ du 10 au 11 février 2006, l’accueil,
l’hébergement et la mise en condition des
observateurs ;
§ le 11 février, le déploiement des
équipes dans les différentes régions
;
§ le 12 février, l'observation du scrutin
;
§ le 13 février, le désengagement
;
§ du 14 au 15 février, la remise en condition,
l'appréciation de l'observation et le retour dans
les différents Etats.
23. Une rencontre d’information a eu lieu, le samedi
11 Février 2006, avec les fonctionnaires du Ministère
des Affaires Etrangères du Cap Vert portant sur
les objectifs de la mission d’observation de la
CEDEAO.
24. Une rencontre d’information a eu lieu avec
le Directeur General de l’Administration Electorale
pour donner aux observateurs, une vue d'ensemble du contexte
et de l’état des préparatifs du scrutin.
25. Une autre a eu lieu entre la mission d’observation
et le représentant du Forum des ONG capverdiennes
portant sur le rôle de la Société
civile en période électorale.
26. Les observateurs se sont déployés dans
Praia et ses alentours et à Fogo.
27. Soit un total de six (6) équipes reparties
sur deux (2) des (10) régions que compte le Cap
Vert.
28. En matière de communication, une carte SIM
a été allouée à chaque Chef
d’équipe avec un crédit forfaitaire.
29. En outre, des procédures ont été
élaborées à l'endroit des différentes
équipes régionales précisant les
formats de comptes rendus quotidien et d'incident ainsi
que le format du rapport final.
30. Les fiches d'observation ont été distribuées
et des consignes précises données à
l'ensemble des observateurs par rapport au comportement
et au devoir de réserve vis-à-vis des médias.
B. Observation du scrutin
§ L’ouverture et la clôture des bureaux
de vote
31. Il ressort de l’observation que les heures
d’ouverture et de fermeture des bureaux de vote,
respectivement huit (8) heures et dix huit (18) heures,
ont été globalement respectés conformément
aux dispositions de la loi électorale.
§ Le matériel électoral
32. Dans l’ensemble, le matériel électoral
était complet et disponible dans tous les bureaux
de vote.
§ La sécurité des bureaux de vote
33. Aucun incident majeur n a été observé
ni signalé. La sécurité a été
régulièrement assurée par des agents
qui ont opéré en patrouilles discrètes
dans les différents lieux de vote.
§ Le secret du vote
34. Le secret du vote a été assuré
; des isoloirs se trouvaient dans tous les bureaux de
vote et disposés de manière à protéger
le choix des électeurs.
§ Le dépouillement
35. A la lecture des différents rapports, le dépouillement
s’est fait conformément aux dispositions
de la loi électorale.
§ La proclamation des résultats
36. Les résultats ont été collationnés
sur place en présence des représentants
des candidats, co- signés sur les documents appropriés
et affichés à la porte de chaque bureau
de vote.
§ Les agents électoraux
37. Les agents électoraux ont une bonne connaissance
des dispositions de la loi électorale et ont exécuté
leurs tâches avec conscience et efficacité.
§ La participation
38. Dans l’ensemble, les équipes n’ont
pas constaté une forte affluence. Les électeurs
se sont acquittés de leurs taches sans bousculade.
Le taux de participation (53,01/%) est moyen.
C. Les résultats globaux provisoires
Inscrits Nombre de votants Bulletinsnuls Bulletinsblancs
Abstention Pedro Pires Carlos Veiga
323.594 171.542 1.400 658 151.823 86396 83088
% 53,01 O, 43 O, 20 46,95 50,98 49,02
Source : DGAE
V. OBSERVATIONS ET ANALYSES
Eléments critiques du code électoral
39. La loi électorale du Cap Vert, notamment en
son article 196, ne permet pas l’observation des
élections dans le sens défini par les termes
de référence de la CEDEAO. Cependant, les
autorités capverdiennes n’ont ménagé
aucun effort pour faciliter la mission d’observation
de la CEDEAO.
40. La mission d’observation n’a pas relevé
de disposition qui permet l’identification de l’électeur
qui a déjà exercé son droit.
41. En dépit de l’article 195 du code électoral
qui interdit toute propagande dans les lieux de vote et
aux alentours le jour du scrutin, la mission a constaté
que cette disposition n’a pas été
suffisamment respectée.
42. Le scrutin présidentiel du 12 Février
2006 du Cap Vert s’est déroulé dans
la transparence, la sincérité et la sérénité.
43. L’organisation, hormis quelques légères
imperfections inhérentes à tout processus,
n’a pas connu de problèmes majeurs.
44. En outre, il est à signaler la représentation
significative des femmes et des jeunes dans la composition
des membres des bureaux de votes, ainsi que leur bonne
participation au vote.
45. Il faut également remarquer la présence
des délégués des candidats dans tous
les bureaux de vote.
46. Par ailleurs, la mission a rendu une visite de courtoisie
au Président de la Commission Nationale Electorale.
47. Un autre rencontre a également eu lieu entre
le chef de la mission d’observation, le coordinateur
et les représentants de FOSCAO (Forum des Organisation
de la Société Civile de l’Afrique
de l’Ouest)
VI. RECOMMANDATIONS
48. A la suite de l’observation du scrutin du 12
Février 2006, la mission d’observation fait
les recommandations suivantes :
§ intégrer le concept de l’observation
des élections dans le dispositif légal ;
§ veiller au respect des dispositions de la loi
électorale quant à la propagande électorale
;
§ intensifier les campagnes d’éducation
civique afin d’améliorer la participation
des populations au processus électoral ;
§ améliorer le processus d’identification
des électeurs pour prévenir les votes multiples.
VII. CONCLUSION
49. Le scrutin présidentiel du 12 Février
2006, tel qu’il a été observé,
par la mission d’observation de la CEDEAO, s’est
déroulé globalement dans de bonnes conditions,
dans une atmosphère empreinte de paix et de sérénité.
50. Au vu de ce qui précède, la mission
d’observation de la CEDEAO,
§ remercie les autorités Cap verdiennes pour
leur assistance, coopération et collaboration qu’elles
ont bien voulu apporter à la mission d’observation.
§ adresse ses félicitations pour la bonne
organisation des opérations électorales.
§ encourage les autorités Cap Verdiennes
pour la prise en compte du concept genre et de l’implication
de la jeunesse dans le processus électoral ;
§ prend acte de la participation des Cap Verdiens
de la diaspora au scrutin présidentiel et encourage
les différentes institutions à une plus
grande implication de ceux-ci ;
§ apprécie l’informatisation du système
et la scelerité de la proclamation des résultats
du scrutin.
FAIT À PRAIA, LE 14 Fevrier 2006
ONT SIGNE:
HON. MOHAMMED ABASS MR. ADAMA DIAKHATE
MR. FIRMIN KONE DR. ABDULKARIM KOROMA
MR. GAOUSSOU DIARRAH MR. AMADOU BAILO DIALLO
MR. SERIFO JALO ALHADJI MALAM MANE
MR. CHIJIOKE JAMES Mr. TAJUDEEN JINADU
MRS. TOURE ALZOUMA MAÏMOUNA MR. SALIOU SAMBOU
DR. ABDEL-FATAU MUSAH MR. MACARIO MARQUES PERDIGAO
MR. UWEM THOMPSON
PEDRO GODINHO GOMES
CHEF DE MISSION
ECOWAS
OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ELECTION
IN THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN
18TH – 23rd MARCH 2006
FINAL REPORT - Executive Secretariat, Cotonou,
23rd March 2006
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN.
III. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A. Preparatory Work of the Mission
B. Observation of Voting Process
C. Provisional Results
IV. OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
VII. ANNEXES
· Turn out and Provisional Results
· Declaration
INTRODUCTION
1. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS deployed twenty
(20) observers to the Republic of Benin with the task
of observing the run-off election held on Sunday, 19th
March 2006. This is in conformity with the provisions
of Article 12 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,
the Supplementary Protocol relating to the Mechanism on
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security and the implementation of Decision A/DEC.19/01/03
of the 26th Session of the Authority of Heads of State
and Government held in Dakar on 31 January 2003, which
mandate the Executive Secretary to send into any member
state holding elections, either a supervisory or observer
mission.
2. The ECOWAS Observer Mission was made up of delegations
from Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Togo and personnel of the Executive Secretariat.
3. The Mission was led by H.E. Bitokotipou Yagninim,
member of the ECOWAS Council of Elders. The Coordinator
of the Mission was Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah of the Executive
Secretariat.
4. The terms of Reference of the Observer Mission were
as follows :
(i) To be in close contact with the competent authorities
of the host country;
(ii) As may be necessary, to cooperate with other NGOs
and all
other observer missions while still keeping the independence
of the mission;
(iii) To refrain from making any individual declarations.
Every declaration was to be the collective view of the
mission and issued on behalf of the mission by the chief
of mission or a spokesperson designated for such a task;
(iv) To forward a report to the Executive Secretary addressing
the following:
· Everything the mission had observed;
· All information gathered by the mission;
· Assessment of the election against the yardstick
of national electoral laws and universally accepted electoral
principles;
· Recommendations on ways to improve future elections
and observer missions;
(v) The report of the Observer Mission is to be signed
by every member of the mission and submitted to the Executive
Secretary by the Chief of Mission within a period not
later then fifteen (15) days from the end of the mission.
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN
5. For general information on the Republic of Benin,
please refer to the relevant section of the final report
on the first round dated 7th March 2006.
III. PREPARATORY WORK OF THE OBSERVER MISSION
A. Preparation towards the Mission
6. With the exception of one observer, all other observers
on this mission were also members of the observer mission
to the first round of the presidential election held on
Sunday, 5th March 2006.
7. As a result of late communication to the Executive
Secretariat regarding the actual date for the run-off,
the ECOWAS observer mission made a precipitate arrival
in Cotonou on Saturday, 18th March 2006.
8. On the night of Saturday, 18th March 2006, there was
a normal briefing by the coordinating team and head of
ECOWAS Zonal Bureau. This briefing was chaired by the
head of the mission. At this meeting, information on administrative
and logistic matters were discussed, notably:
· Accommodation
· Transport
· Means of Communication
· Health
· Financial matters
9. For the purpose of coordination and security, all
observers were accommodated at Hotel Croix du Sud before
their deployment to the field. A secretariat and conference
room were made available for the observers at Hotel Croix
du Sud for the purpose of coordinating the different activities
of the Observer Mission.
10. In line with the plan of deployment, the work of
the mission comprised seven (7) phases:
· In the evening of Saturday, 18th March 2006,
observers were welcomed, accommodated and settled;
· That same evening, observers were deployed into
teams of two or three persons to do a preliminary reconnaissance
and assessment of the prevailing mood and situation in
Benin;
· The plan of deployment of the teams into the
field to observe the election on Sunday, 19th March 2006
was announced to the observers late into the night of
Saturday 18th March 2006 after the teams had reassembled
to discuss their preliminary assessment report;
· 19th March 2006: The major activity was observation
of the actual voting process from before opening of polling
stations until the counting of ballots. The deployment
of the teams was to the following southern administrative
districts: Littoral (Cotonou and its environs), Oueme
(Porto Novo and its environs) and Atlantique (Abomey-Calavi).
The coordinating team also put in place a system to receive
information from the districts of Borgou, Donga and Zou.
The head of each team was given a SIM card and two rechargeable
Areeba cards of 100 units each to assist in inter-team
communication and also communication between deployed
teams and the coordinating team;
· Night of 19th March 2006: Teams reassembled
at base for a debriefing session chaired by the head of
mission;
· 20th March 2006: Preliminary Declaration of ECOWAS
observer mission issued at a press briefing at Hotel Croix
Du Sud. The head of mission addressed the briefing;
· 21st to 24th March 2006: In-depth analysis of
the observation, and preparation of report (while waiting
for the official results to be declared by CENA). Return
of observers to their respective countries.
B. Observation of Voting Process
· The opening and closing of polling stations
11. Most polling stations opened within one hour of the
stipulated official time of 07:00 and closed after nine
(9) hours of voting as stipulated by law.
· Electoral materials
12. Most electoral materials were complete and available
in all the polling stations observed. Indeed, reusable
materials used in the first round had been secured within
the voting vicinities and this greatly alleviated the
logistical problems observed in the first round.
· Security at polling stations
13. No major incidents were observed or reported. Security
was effectively assured by the competent agents who carried
out regular and non-intrusive patrols in the electoral
areas observed.
· Secrecy of the Ballot
14. The secrecy of the ballot was assured; polling screens
were installed in some polling stations and improvised
in others to protect the secrecy of each voter’s
choice.
· Identification of Voters
15. Within the limits of logistical constraints observed,
adequate measures were taken to prevent double voting,
including the marking of voter ID cards used in the first
round, repeat finger printing against names on the voters’
list and the use of indelible ink.
· Counting Process
16. From the reports of the different teams, the process
of counting in the areas observed was done in conformity
with the provisions of the electoral laws.
· Summary of Voting Process
17. The process of identification, voting by secret ballot,
counting and consolidation took place with a high level
of transparency, thus protecting the confidentiality and
integrity of the voting process.
· Declaration of results
18. The results were collated in the open in the presence
of representatives of the presidential candidates assigned
to the polling stations and in the presence of the electorate.
Party representatives jointly signed on the legally provided
appropriate record sheets and results were openly displayed.
· Election Officials
19. There was a marked improvement in the application
of the electoral laws by the election officials who carried
out their tasks with greater confidence and efficiency,
than in the first round.
· Voter turnout
20. The electorate was determined to exercise its mandate
in a calm atmosphere, with discipline and patience. The
turnout was good.
C. Provisional results (see annex)
IV. OBSERVATION AND ANALYSES
21. The presidential run-off of 19th March 2006 was free,
fair, transparent and credible and took place in a peaceful
atmosphere.
22. Both candidates were represented by their agents
at the polling stations observed.
23. The voter card, the only document which could allow
one to vote, was not sufficient to identify a voter since
it had no photograph affixed to it. This situation could
favour its use by persons other than its actual owner.
24. Since the electoral list was hand-written, had no
serial numbers, and comprised separate loose sheets it
could be a source for manipulation during voting.
25. Even though the open air counting was a mark of transparency,
this could in certain cases, pose a risk for the security
of electoral materials, election officers and the integrity
of the voting process.
26. Coordination and communication between the national
headquarters of CENA and its sub-structures were reinforced
and better organised in the run-off compared to the first
round of 5th March 2006.
27. In general, the media, civil society and the political
class helped to create a peaceful atmosphere for the election
as well as in raising awareness among the electorate.
28. In the run-up to the second round, the vast majority
of the presidential candidates who were eliminated after
the first round, openly declared their support for Dr.
Yayi Boni, who led in the first round. This development
convinced the electorate that the outcome of the second
round was already a foregone conclusion. The short notice
of less than twenty four (24) hours given to the electorate
to go to the polls may also have accounted for the lower
turnout in the run-off. The coordinating team was in constant
touch with the Executive Secretary who directed that the
mission makes an early declaration on its findings. This
was done in the afternoon of Monday, 20th March 2006.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
29. Following from the observations made on the election
process on 19th March, 2006, the observer mission recommends
as follows:
· That the ECOWAS Secretariat request each member
state to have a clear calendar of events leading to presidential
and legislative elections;
· that each member state have unambiguous constitutional
provisions and electoral codes that clearly fix the dates
and conditions for elections;
· That ECOWAS advises the authorities to establish
their national electoral commissions at least one year
before the holding of elections and if possible to make
them permanent and independent ;
· that ECOWAS considers supporting the organisation
of elections in member states when the need arises, given
the problems of logistics certain member states may face.
This should aim at making the respective national electoral
commissions independent;
· that ECOWAS recommends to member states to accord
special attention to voters who are physically challenged,
aged, expectant and nursing mothers;
· that ECOWAS encourages the computerisation of
the electoral system of member states to enhance quality;
· that the security and delivery of electoral
materials be improved upon;
· that the laws governing the opening and closing
hours of voting be respected;
· that the means of communication within electoral
management bodies for better coordination be improved;
· that ECOWAS considers the possibility of setting
up zonal logistic depots of electoral materials which
could be placed at the disposal of member states;
· that ECOWAS compiles a compendium of electoral
laws of member states in all the official languages of
ECOWAS;
· that a study be conducted on these electoral
laws with a view to assisting member state to resolve
potential electoral conflicts and working towards the
harmonisation of electoral norms and practices within
the ECOWAS space.
VI. CONCLUSION
30. The presidential run-off of 19th March 2006 was peaceful,
free, fair, transparent and credible.
31. The ECOWAS Observer Mission expresses its gratitude
to the authorities and people of the Republic of Benin,
for their assistance and cooperation accorded the mission
and commend them for the conduct of successful elections.
Cotonou, 23rd March 2006
ECOWAS
OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE GAMBIA
15 - 27 SEPTEMBER 2006
FINAL REPORT - Executive Secretariat, Banjul, 25th September
2006
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE GAMBIA.
A. Geography and Demography
B. Administrative Information
C. Brief History and Politics of The Gambia
III. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A. Preparatory Work of the Mission
B. Observation of the Voting Process
C. An overview on provisional Results
IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
VII. ANNEXES
· Geographical Map of The Gambia
· Constitution
· Electoral Code
· Terms of Reference
· Distribution of Teams of Observers by regions
· Reporting Forms for Observation
· List of Polling Stations
· Provisional Election Results
· Communiqué issued by various International
Observation Missions
INTRODUCTION
1. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS deployed forty (40)
observers to The Gambia with the task of observing the
presidential election held on Friday, 22 September 2006.
This is in conformity with the provisions of Article 12
of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the
Supplementary Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
and the implementation of Decision A/DEC.19/01/03 of the
26th Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government
held in Dakar on 31 January 2003, which mandate the Executive
Secretary to send into any member state holding elections,
either a supervisory or observer mission.
2. The ECOWAS Observer Mission was made up of delegations
from Member States of ECOWAS, personnel of the Executive
Secretariat and the ECOWAS Parliament, ECOWAS Ambassadors
accredited to Nigeria, as well as ECOWAS trained observers
.
3. The Mission was led by Hon. Elizabeth Alpha-Lavalie,
Deputy Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and member of the ECOWAS Council of Elders. The
Coordinator of the Mission was Mr. Komi Ruben Dogbe, Head
of Electoral Assistance Unit of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat.
4. The terms of reference of the Observer Mission were
as follows:
(i) To maintain close contact with the competent authorities
of the host country.
(ii) To cooperate with other NGOs and other observer
missions, as may be necessary, while still maintaining
the independence of the Mission.
(iii) The members of the Mission to refrain from making
any individual declarations. Declarations made were to
reflect the collective view of the Mission and issued
on behalf of the Mission by the Chief of Mission or a
spokesperson designated for such a task.
(iv) The Head of Mission to forward a report, signed
by every member of the Mission, to the Executive Secretary
within a period not later than 15 days from the end of
the Mission. The report should include:
· observations of the Mission;
· all relevant information gathered by the Mission;
· assessment of the election against the yardstick
of national electoral laws and universally accepted electoral
principles.
· recommendations on ways to improve future elections
and Observer Missions.
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE GAMBIA
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACT FILE
11,295 square kilometers in size and with a population
of 1.5 million, The Gambia is one of the tiniest Member-States
in the ECOWAS sub-region. It is completely surrounded
by Senegal except for the Atlantic Ocean to the south.
Its geographical location within the Senegambia enclave
imposes unique security challenges on the country. It
serves as a bridge between mainland Senegal and its troubled
Casamance enclave and shares common ethnic and cultural
ties (Jola) not only with the enclave, but also with another
unstable country – Guinea Bissau. The Gambia is
also the tourist destination of choice, as well as a major
source of retail trade goods, in the Senegambian enclave.
These characteristics have exerted direct and indirect
impacts on the evolution of the Gambian political and
security landscape. Apart from direct military threats
emanating from outside its borders as well as the burden
of refugee flows, the country has had to deal with other
challenges to security related to cross-border crime,
paedophilia and human trafficking, custom and free movement
issues.
The main ethnic groups that populate the Gambia are Fula,
Mandinka, Jola, Serahule and Wollof. The Gambia is an
LDC State, with an illiteracy rate of 61% and dependent
primarily on groundnut exports and tourism for its income.
In 2000, the UNDP Human Development Report ranked the
country at 161 out of 174 countries.
The Gambia gained independence from British colonial
rule in 1965, becoming a Republic in April 1970 with an
Executive President and a Parliament. In contrast to a
number of African countries, The Gambia retained a democratic
tradition, holding regular multi-party parliamentary elections
every 5 years and the Parliament in turn electing an Executive
President. In 1982, the electoral system was modified
to allow for the direct election of the President by the
electorate. Following an attempted coup by the paramilitary
Field Force in July 1981, Senegalese troops intervened
to restore the Government of President Sir Dawda Jawara,
an act that culminated in a temporary amalgamation of
the two States through the creation of the Confederation
of Senegambia. Irreconcilable differences led to the break-up
of the Confederation in September, 1989.
The Government, led by President Jawara’s ruling
People’s Progressive Party (PPP), was finally overthrown
July 1994 by a group of junior officers led by then Lieutenant
Yahya Jammeh, who set up the Armed Forces Provisional
Revolutionary Council junta (AFPRC). Two years into military
rule and under the double pressure of internal demands
and the wave of democratization sweeping Africa, The Gambia
returned to controlled multi-party democracy following
a referendum on a new constitution in August 1996. Consequently,
a presidential election was held on 26th September 1996
under an electoral management body controlled by the Interior
Ministry. The parties that operated before the 1994 coup
were barred.
The four new parties that contested the 1996 elections
were: The Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
(APRC) led by Mr. Yahya Jammeh who resigned from the military
to run in the elections; The United Democratic Party (UDP)
led by Barrister Ousainou Darboe; The Peoples Democratic
Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) led
by Mr. Sidia Jatta; and the National Reconciliation Party
(NRP) led by Mr. Hamat Bah. Jammeh won 56% of the votes
to become the first President of the Second Republic.
National Assembly Elections was held on the 2nd of January,
1997 and the APRC won 33 seats out of 45. UDP won 7 seats,
NRP 2 seats, and PDOIS 1 seat and 2 Independent Candidates.
In the Presidential election of 18th October 2001 in
which the pre-coup parties contested for the first time,
President Jammeh was returned into office but with a reduced
majority of 52.96%, representing 242.302 votes. The new
Coalition composed of UDP, the reinstated PPP and the
Gambia People’s Party (GPP) and led by Mr. Ousainou
Darboe polled 149.448 votes. Hamat Bah’s National
Reconciliation Party (NRP) polled 35.671 votes while Sheriff
Moustapha Dibba’s reinstated National Convention
Party (NCP) won 17.271 votes. PDOIS won 13.841 votes.
In the National Assembly Elections that followed in January
2002, the main opposition alliance led by the main opposition
party UDP staged a boycott, citing fraud and an uneven
political playing field during the presidentials. Consequently,
APRC ran unopposed in 33 of the 48 constituencies. PDOIS
and NRP took part. PDOIS won 2 seats and NRP won 1 seat.
On 22nd September, 2006, the Gambian electorate went
to the polls to elect the President of the country. Three
candidates representing the ruling APRC and two opposition
alliances contested the elections. The candidates were
:
1. the incumbent, President Yahya Jammeh of the Alliance
for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC);
2. Barrister Ousainu Darbo, representing the United Democratic
Party (UDP)-National Reconciliation Party (NRP) Alliance
; and
3. Halifa Salla, the flag-bearer for the National Alliance
for Democracy and Development (NADD).
The Independent Electoral Commission officially opened
its doors to receive nominations on 28th August. The electoral
campaign officially started on 31st August and ended on
20th September. During the campaign, the Independent Electoral
Commission oversaw the distribution of equal airtime to
all candidates on state radio and television. Candidates
were also allowed to buy additional slots should they
so desire, particularly from the private media.
From our analyses and media reports, it appeared obvious
that President Yahya Jammeh was going to win easily, particularly
as the opposition parties, the NADD and UDP-NRP alliances,
failed to unite and present a single candidate to challenge
the President. In the last presidential election, President
Jammeh won just under 53% of the vote. Taking this into
account, the opposition parties had decided to put up
a single candidate to offer them the best chance of victory
in 2006. Discussions towards this end did not achieve
their objective.
The President also appeared to have taken note of his
narrow victory and, taking advantage of his party’s
near monopoly in parliament following opposition boycott,
to introduce far-reaching amendments to the Constitution
to enhance his chances of victory. Part 3 of the 1996
Constitution required a presidential candidate to garner
more than 50% of the vote to be declared winner without
the need for a run-off. In 2001, this clause was amended
to allow a candidate to be declared President with a simple
majority (First past the post). For the incumbent, therefore,
the more candidates that presented themselves, the greater
his chances for victory.
Given the advantages of incumbency, impressive development
projects that had sprung up in the last few years (construction
of roads, airport, university and other infrastructure),
APRC control over limitless resources as well as the wave
of presidential euphoria following the hosting of the
AU Summit, it was going to be near impossible for the
opposition to cause an upset, except by fielding a single
candidate and greatly improving their campaign message
and campaing.
III. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A Preporatory Work of the Mission
Since October 2005, ECOWAS has been interacting with
relevant authorities of The Gambia and monitoring progress
in the preparations towards the presidential election
through its Zonal Bureau I for Conflict Prevention based
in Banjul. These consultations have been fruitful and
following an invitation from the Government of The Gambia,
an ECOWAS fact-finding mission was dispatched to Banjul
in July 2006. The Mission held consultations with the,
the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), political
parties, Government and security agencies, members of
civil society organisations , the media and ECOWAS international
partners.
On receipt of the report of the fact-finding mission,the
Executive Secretary of ECOWAS dispatched an ECOWAS coordinating
team to Banjul on 15 September 2006, to prepare the ground
for the deployment of the Observer Mission and to hold
further consultations with relevant agencies and other
observer missions such as, the Commonwealth Observer Mission.
For the purpose of coordination and security, ECOWAS
observers were accommodated at the Paradise Suites Hotel,
Kololi before their deployment to the field.
In line with the plan of deployment, the work of the
Mission comprised six (6) phases as follows:
· Tuesday, 19 September 2006: Arrival of observers.
· Wednesday, 20 September, 2006: Briefing by the
coordinating team on the plan of deployment of the observers,
accommodation, transportation, communication, health and
financial matters.
· Thursday, 21 September 2006 : Departure of observer
teams detailed for administrative divisions where they
were required to sleep overnight.
· Friday, 22 September 2006 : Observation of the
voting and counting processes.
· Saturday, 23 September 2006: Debriefing of observers
and press conference addressed by the Head of Mission
on ECOWAS preliminary declaration at the Paradise Suites
Hotel.
· Saturday 23-Monday 25 September 2006: discussions
and analysis of evaluation reports and preparation of
final report.
ECOWAS observers were deployed to all the seven administrative
divisions of The Gambia.
Each team was provided with a kit which included a SIM
card, one rechargeable card and a First Aid Box.
On noticing that the colours of the ECOWAS t-shirts and
some caps that were designed for the Observer Mission
were of the same colours as those of two of the presidential
candidates, it was decided that ECOWAS observers should
not wear these t-shirts and caps.
B: Observation of the Voting Process
· The opening and closing of polling stations
Most polling stations opened within 15 minutes of the
stipulated official time of 07:00 Hrs and closed at 18:30
Hrs instead of 16:00 Hrs because the IEC had to extend
the closing time by two and half hours to compensate for
time lost as a result of heavy rains. However, a few polling
stations closed at 16:00hrs as stipulated by law because
by the time the polling officials received the information
for extension of voting hours, they had already closed
voting and sealed the ballot drums.
· Electoral materials
Electoral materials were complete and available in all
polling stations observed.
· Security at polling stations
No major incidents were observed or reported. Security
was effectively assured.
· Secrecy of the vote
The secrecy of the vote was assured; polling screens
were installed in some polling stations while others were
improvised so as to protect the secrecy of the vote.
· Identification of Voters
Adequate measures were taken to prevent double voting.
These included the checking of voters ID cards, the cross
checking of names on voters’ list by all representatives
of the candidates and the use of indelible ink. A backup
counter foil register with pictures was used as the last
resort to cross check the identity of a voter who had
an ID card but whose name did not appear on the voters’
list .
· Voting Process
Polling stations were easily identifiable and the voters
demonstrated commendable patience and orderliness while
waiting to cast their ballots. No scuffles or acts of
violence were recorded. Each of the three candidates fielded
representatives at most of the polling stations observed.
The cordiality displayed among representatives of competing
candidate is commendable. Vigilance of the candidates
representatives is also commendable.
· Counting and Collation Processes
The counting and collation processes were transparent
and done in conformity with the provisions of the electoral
laws.
· Declaration of results
The results were declared in the open in the presence
of representatives of the presidential candidates assigned
to the counting centres, international and local observers
as well as the electorate. Legally provided appropriate
record sheets were jointly signed by representatives of
the candidates. The manner in which the results were being
released by the IEC in batches, on television and radio,
in English and in local languages added credibility to
the whole process.
· Election Officials
The election officials had a good working knowledge of
the provisions of the electoral law and carried out their
tasks with a high sense of moral conscience, confidence
and efficiency.
· Voter Turnout
Overall, the voter turnout was fairly good even though
it was below the average percentage in the sub-region.
C: An Overview of Provisional Results (see annex)
IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Inspite of some disturbing trends which characterised
the period leading to the election, there were no major
problems regarding the general credibility of the election.
Even though each candidate had fair access to the public
media during the two-week campaign, the posters and billboards
of the incumbent president who was also a presidential
candidate was disproportionately overbearing. The posters
and billboards of the other two candidates were virtually
non-existent.
A consequence arising out of human rights violations
and restrictions on the freedom of expression led to the
self censorship of the media, many of whom felt intimidated.
Members of the uniformed state security services were
seen openly displaying (including wearing) badges, t-shirts,
caps and scarves of a particular presidential candidate.
This was clearly against universally accepted electoral
principles and the Memorandum of Understanding signed
by all the political players.
At a particular polling station in Bakau, soldiers were
seen voting in the presence of a senior military officer,
which gave the impression that it was a deliberate and
provocative act on the part of the ruling government machinery.
It is pertinent to note that soldiers who attempted to
vote but were not registered to vote at this polling stations
were fiercely resisted by representatives of the other
candidates. This resulted in the retreat of the soldiers
from further voting.
The opposition in The Gambia may have their own weaknesses
since they did not position themselves in such a way that
they could be viewed as governments-in- waiting. These
weaknesses include lack of a message ,resources, internal
capacity to mobilise people and the inability to inspire
a nationalistic identity and image.
Furthermore, what may have happened was that the registration
exercise was flawed which might have resulted in under
aged persons, and possibly non-Gambians, being registered
to vote.
What is becoming clear as a trend is that, on the day
of election nothing untoward will be recorded but any
possible rigging would have been carried out during the
process leading up to the election, including the registration
exercise, the misuse of incumbency and intimidation.
The coordinating team stayed in constant touch with the
Executive Secretary who directed that the mission makes
an early declaration on its findings. This was done at
the press conference of Saturday, 23 September 2006.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Following from the observations made on the voting process
on 22 September 2006, the Observer Mission recommends
the following, that Member States should be :
· Reminded to strictly respect and adhere to the
constitution and electoral code of the Member State, all
inter-political party Memorandum of Understanding and
all other agreements that all political parties may have
arrived at in relation to elections.
· Encouraged to draw up a clear calendar of events
leading to presidential and legislative (Parliamentary)
elections;
· Reminded to have unambiguous constitutional
provisions and electoral codes that clearly fix the dates
and conditions for elections;
· Reminded to appoint members of their Independent
National Electoral Commissions at least one year before
the actual date of elections;
· Reminded that frequent changes in the appointment
of chairpersons and members of National Electoral Commissions
not only undermine the credibility of the electoral process
but also are not in the supreme interest of democracy;
· Encouraged to accord special attention to voters
who are physically challenged, aged, expectant and nursing
mothers;
· Encouraged to ensure that security agencies
are made to vote at least two days before the day of national
elections. Such voting must be subject to the same controls
and checks as the national election;
· Encouraged to improve upon the security and
delivery of electoral materials;
It is also recommended that:
· The laws governing the opening and closing hours
of voting are strictly respected;
· The means of communication within electoral
management bodies for better coordination are improved
upon;
· The counting of ballots be done on the spot.
· The efforts to harmonise the electoral systems
and processes within the sub-region should be speeded
up;
It is strongly recommended that ECOWAS Observer Missions
be dispatched to the mission areas at least four days
before the actual election day to enable the missions
to be better acquainted with the security and political
situation during the last days of the political campaigns.
The Observer Mission noted with satisfaction, the establishment
of the ECOWAS Electoral Assistance Unit and recommends
that the Unit be given all the necessary support to make
its mark on the democratic agenda of ECOWAS Member States.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the presidential election of 22 September
2006, in The Gambia was adjudged by the Mission as generally
peaceful, free, fair, transparent and credible. In its
press conference, the Head of Mission called on all the
candidates and their supporters to continue to play their
part in the consolidation of peace in The Gambia by accepting
the outcome of the election and resorting to only legal
and constitutional means to resolve any eventual disputes
as stipulated in the electoral laws of the land.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Mission was
accorded all necessary courtesies which enabled it to
discharge its task without hindrance and recommends that
the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS conveys to the Government
and people of The Gambia its appreciation and gratitude
for a successful mission.
Banjul, 24th September 2006
ECOWAS
OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN MALI,
BAMAKO,
29 APRIL 2007
FINAL REPORT - ECOWAS COMMISSION, BAMAKO
6 MAY 2007
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
A) Overview of Geography and Demography
B) Administrative Information
C) History and Recent Politics
D) Constitutional Organisation of State
III. CONTEXT
IV. PLAN OF WORK OF OBSERVER MISSION
A) Preparatory Work of the Mission
B) Observation of Voting Process
V. ANALYSIS
VI AUDIENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
VII. PROVISIONAL RESULTS
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
IX. CONCLUSION
X. ANNEXES
· Geographical map of Republic of MALI
· Constitution
· Electoral Law
· Terms of Reference
· Administrative Note
· Deployment of Observer Team into Zones
· ECOWAS Observer Mission Reporting Forms
· List of polling Stations
· Provisional Election Results
· Preliminary Declaration by ECOWAS Observer Mission
· Press Release
INTRODUCTION
The President of ECOWAS Commission deployed an Observer
Mission to Mali for the 29 April 2007 Presidential Election.
This is in conformity with the provisions of Article 12
of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the
Supplementary Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security as well as the implementation of Decision A/DEC/19/01/03
of the 26th session of the Authority of Heads of State
and Government held in Dakar on 31st January 2003 which
mandate the President of ECOWAS Commission to send to
any member state holding elections a supervisory or observer
mission to those elections, if he deems it necessary.
2. The sixty-member ECOWAS Observer Mission to the 29
April 2007 Presidential Election in the Republic of Mali
was composed of delegations from member-states of ECOWAS,
representatives of the ECOWAS Parliament and ECOWAS ambassadors
accredited to Nigeria as well as electoral experts drawn
from electoral management bodies and civil society organizations
from the sub-region.
3. The Mission was led by H.E. Mr. Koffi SAMA, former
Prime Minister of the Republic of Togo and coordinated
by a technical support team from the ECOWAS Commission.
The coordinating team from the ECOWAS Commission was headed
by Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah, Conflict Prevention Adviser
to the ECOWAS Commission.
4. The terms of reference of the Observer Mission were
as follows:
I. To be in close contact with the competent authorities
of the host country;
II. As may be necessary, to cooperate with other NGOs
and observer missions, while still keeping the independence
of the mission;
III. That member of the mission were to refrain from
making any personal statement on the election. Every statement
was to be the collective view of the mission and issued
on behalf of the mission by the head of mission or a spokesperson
designated for such a task;
IV. To forward a report to the President of the ECOWAS
Commission addressing the following:
· Everything the mission had observed by themselves;
· All information gathered by the mission from
witnesses;
· Its assessment of the election against the yardstick
of national electoral laws and universally accepted electoral
principles;
· Its recommendations on ways to improve future
elections and observer missions in the sub region.
5. The report of the observer mission was to be signed
by every member of the mission and submitted to the President
of the ECOWAS by the Head of Mission within a period not
later than fifteen (15) from the end of the mission.
II. GENERAL INFORMATION ON MALI
A. OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY
Mali, officially Republic of Mali, a landlocked West African
Republic, is bordered on the north by Algeria, on the
east by Niger, and Burkina Faso, on the south by Côte
d’Ivoire and Guinea, and on the West by Senegal,
and Mauritania. Mali is a relatively large country with
a surface area of 1,240,192 sq km (478,841 sq mi). This
corresponds to a size a little over 30 times the size
of Switzerland or the combined size of Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. The distance
between the North and the South of Mali is 1600 km. 65%
of the Territory of Mali is covered by desert and it is
one of the poorest countries of the world.
Most of Mali consists of low plains broken occasionally
by rocky hills. In the south-east the Hombori Mountains
rise to 1,155 m (3,789 ft), and in the south-west the
Bambouk and Manding mountains are separated by an area
of sandy lowlands north and north-west of the River Niger,
which cuts an arc across Mali. The northern third of the
country lies within the Sahara. In the west is a part
of the Sahel, a semi-arid transitional zone between the
savannah areas of the south and the Sahara desert to the
north.
In 2006, the population of Mali was estimated at 11716829,
giving an average population density of about 10 people
per sq km (25 per sq mi). 90% of Malians live in the south
of the country. Almost all the population of Mali is African;
the major groups are the Bambara, Fulani, Tuareg, Soninké,
Sénouf, Songhai, Malinké, and Dogon. Nomadic
Tuaregs and other Berbers roam the Sahel and parts of
the Sahara. 40% of Malians are Mandingos (mainly bambaras.)
they live in the Wast of the country (Bamako). The Songhai
inhabits the est and the Soninké live in the West;
the Sénouf live around Sikasso, in the area bordering
Burkina Faso and the Côte d’Ivoire. The Dogon
are found further in the North east on the Bandiagara
plateau. The Fulani inhabits the Manne arc while the Sahara
is the domain of the Maures. the nomadic Touareg roam
area between the Sahel and part of the Sahara down to
the Sahelian banks of River Niger which cuts an arc across
Mali.
Since independence from France, these later ethnic groups
numbering about 400,000 have always opposed the political
domination of the Mandingos. This has meant that for them
the fixed international borders and their integration
into a state environment in which they are marginalised
is something they reluctantly accommodate.
In April 1992, a national peace agreement, the Bamako
Accord, was reached between the Government and the main
Touareg groups represented in the Unified Movements and
Fronts of Azawar (MFUA). The armed rebellion continued
with smaller groups in the north of the country and in
neighbouring Niger. Once the conflict was settled, the
problem of creating an autonomous region for the Touareg
continued.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Mali is divided into eight administrative regions, subdivided
into cercles and arondissements, plus the capital district
of Bamako. The larger towns have elected mayors and municipal
council members. The main cities are Bamako, the capital,
with a population of 1,083,000 (1999 estimate); Ségou,
Sikasso, and Mopti, Ségou and Mopti are important
fishing centres. Timbuktu (Tombouctou) is an important
centre of religion and learning. In 2003, 32% of the Malians
were urban dwellers.
French is the official language but African languages
are normally spoken. The Mandingo languages-Bambara, Malinké
and Dyula-as well as the Voltaic languages-Dogun, Senoufo-Songhai,
Hassanya Arabic and two Berber language, Tamasheq and
Tamajaq are widly spoken within different communities.
Bambara tends to be used as the lingua franca.
Islam mixed with the traditional belief is the religion
of about 90 per cent of the population, and about 9 per
cent of the people follow traditional beliefs; about 1
per cent are Christians.
C. BRIEF HISTORY AND RECENT POLITICS
African political activity was banned by the French in
Mali until after World War II. Various parties were formed,
which eventually merged to form the Sudanese Union, which
became the Malian section of the inter-territorial African
Democratic Rally. By the time of the 1957 political reforms,
the Sudanese Union was the main party.
In 1958 the French Sudan voted to join the new French
Community, and it was proclaimed the Sudanese Republic
on November 24, 1958. On January 17, 1959, it joined with
Senegal to form the Federation of Mali, which proclaimed
its independence on June 20, 1960, with Modibo Keita as
its president. The federation broke up in September. Senegal
became a separate state; the former French Sudan retained
the name Mali and Keita remained the president of the
new Republic of Mali, proclaimed on September 22, 1960.
Later that same month the republic became a member of
the UN. After independence, Mali pursued a policy of economic
development along socialist lines.
The Traoré Regime
In November 1968 army officers overthrew the one-man rule
of President Keita and established a military junta led
by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, who later assumed
the presidency. His government, however, was unable to
advance the economy appreciably, having to contend both
with lack of capital and a famine-causing drought in the
mid-1970s. An internal power struggle in 1978 led to an
attempted coup. In the aftermath, several former members
of the junta were tried and sentenced, while political
unrest and repression spread.
President Traoré, running as the only candidate,
was returned to office in 1979 and 1985. Mali was hard
hit by the drought of the mid-1980s. A border war with
Burkina Faso was halted by a ceasefire in late 1985. Under
pressure from its creditors, Mali restructured its economy
in the late 1980s to privatize unprofitable government
enterprises. Traoré was overthrown in March 1991
by a group of army officers.
A new constitution providing for a multi-party republic
was approved in January 1992. Legislative elections were
held in March, resulting in victory for the Alliance for
Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), which set up a coalition government
with two smaller parties. Alpha Oumar Konaré, the
ADEMA leader, became the first democratically elected
president in April. An attempted coup by supporters of
Traoré collapsed in December 1993.
Touareg Rebellion
From the late 1980s northern Mali was ridden by strife.
Fighting broke out between the settled African population
and the nomadic Touareg, and at the same time the region
became involved in a general rebellion of Touareg demanding
greater autonomy from the governments of Mali, Niger,
and Algeria, whose borders cross traditional Touareg territory.
In 1992 a peace agreement, the Bamako Accord, was reached
with the main Touareg groups represented in the Unified
Movements and Fronts of Azawar (MFUA). Conflict continued
with smaller groups into 1995.
In 1996 more than 2,000 Touareg former rebels were integrated
into the regular army. The long conflict led to some 120,000
people becoming refugees; after November, 25,000 Malian
Touareg refugees were repatriated from Niger.
The Konaré Regime
In May 1997 President Konaré was re-elected, and
his ADEMA party returned to power following two rounds
of legislative elections held, after several postponements,
in July and August. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita resigned as
prime minister in September, but was reappointed by President
Konaré the following day. In the same month it
was reported that Switzerland had agreed to return funds
to Mali, amounting to some US$2.67 million, that had been
embezzled and deposited by an anonymous associate of former
president Moussá Traoré.
In January 1999, Traoré—already serving one
prison sentence—his wife Mariam Cissoko, and his
brother-in-law Abraham Cissoko, were sentenced to death
after being found guilty on embezzlement charges. The
sentences were commuted, in September, to life imprisonment
and hard labour.
As tribal violence escalated in 1999, President Konaré
announced, in November, that he would not run for the
presidency in the election planned for 2002. A new prime
minister, Mande Sidibe—formerly an official with
the International Monetary Fund—was appointed after
the resignation of Ibrahim Boukabar Keita, and formed
his Cabinet in February 2000. In July, a fourth report
was published which highlighted alleged corruption in
government-owned companies and other public bodies. Presidential
elections in May 2002 saw a substantial victory for Amadou
Toumani Touré, leader of the March 1991 coup. Parliamentary
elections followed in July, with Espoir 2002, a coalition
of parties including the Rally for Mali, taking 66 of
the 147 seats. The newly appointed prime minister is Ahmed
Mohamed Ag Hamani.
The problems facing Konaré at the start of his
presidency were nothing new: a bloated bureaucracy, protests
by civil servants, trade unionists and students for better
pay, conditions and guaranteed state employment after
graduation, a large debt and a weak private sector. There
was also the spectre of Moussa Traoré to deal with.
The former dictator’s trial began in November 1992
and in February 1993 his was condemned to death for his
role in the debt of 106 protestors in Bamako nearly two
years earlier. Konaré commuted his sentence to
life imprisonment in November 1997, but a second trial-
this time for embezzlement- resulted in a second death
sentence in January 1999. As a last gesture, only days
before stepping down from his presidential seat in 2002,
Konaré pardoned and liberated Traoré, which
was very much in line with general public opinion.
The “Association des Elèves et des Etudiants
du Mali (AEEM)” has become the most powerful and
intransigent of the students interest groups which were
demanding increase grants and improved conditions, and
rioting in 1993 and 1994 brought down Konaré’s
firsts two Prime Ministers, Younoussi Touré and
Abdoulaye Sékou Sow (a 50% devaluation of the FCFA
in January 1994 also contributed to Sow’s departure).
In February 1994 Ibrahim Boubakar Keita was appointed
to the post and quickly gained a reputation as a “hawk”,
arresting all of AEEM leaders and initiating rigoros post-devaluation
austerity measures.
Presidential and legislative elections in 1997 secured
Konaré a second five-year presidential term and
confirmed ADEMA as Mali’s dominant political party.
However, these elections were poorly organised and widely
boycotted by opposition parties, marking the beginning
of a political stalemate between ADEMA and the radical
opposition, who organised themselves into the “Collectif
des Partis de l’Opposition (COPPO)” in November
1997 and boycotted subsequent municipal elections in June
1998 and May and June 1999.
Despite Konaré’s internal problems- which
were relatively trivial in the greatest scheme of African
politics – his Government enjoyed a significant
amount of good weal from western countries. Konaré
proved to be a generally-co-operative leader, who made
an effort to reform the economy and was, after all, one
of Africa’s very few democratically elected leaders
and even more so coming after a military leader who willingly
handed over power to him.
During the 2002 presidential elections, Mali showed the
world that it understood the meaning of democracy. In
the first place, Konaré did not dispute the constitutionally
determined limit of two full terms; his step down peacefully
in May 2002. In the meantime, no less than 24 candidates
had step forward as presidential candidates- one of whom
was a woman. Eventually the filed narrowed down to two
candidates: Soumaïla Cissé – Member
of the ruling ADEMA Party and considered favourite and
a surprising opposition candidate, former transitional
President General Amadou Toumani Touré. The latter,
affectionately called “ATT” by the Malians,
had spent the ten years of Konaré‘s presidency
working as a benefactor in the humanitarian sector, and
he was highly appreciated for his integrity. His return
to politics came as a surprise, opposition candidates,
support groups and even incumbent President Konaré-
despite belonging to the ADEMA Party-supported ATT. The
former Head of State General Amadou Toumany Touré,
who had led Mali in the 1991-1992 transition, won the
2002 presidential election. The popular outsider, whose
lack of personal ambition had gained him the second nickname
of ‘Soldier for democracy’, one 68% of the
votes.
ATT started his term with powerful promises; he pledged
to improve the economy and to promote social housing,
education and jobs for the Youths. At the same time, he
moved carefully, leaving most of Konaré’s
government intact and aiming to unit the Malian people
in a politically stable environment. It was ATT’s
decision to implement strict IMF-supported reform programmes
that caused the first backlash in the otherwise calm waters
of the political system. However, two years down the road
with ATT, the Malian economy surprisingly performed well,
despite difficult circumstances. Even though unemployment
still soared, about 35.000 jobs for the youth were actually
created while the housing programme yielded success with
new residential areas popping up around Bamako and other
towns.
Outsiders claimed that ATT would soon loose the popularity
he has gained during Konaté’s presidency.
However, they were proved wrong, as ATT continued to enjoy
the support of the majority of Malians. Internationally,
in September 2003 he earned a high standing for Mali’s
contribution to the liberation of 14 Europeans hostages
who have been held captive by terrorists in Algeria. There
after, the IMF continued to praise and support Mali’s
social and economic reforms.
The new President who had no political party (and therefore
no parliamentary majority) and his Government brought
on board people from all political parties of the country.
ATT had a tremendous amount of work to do in a country
where 64 % of the population lived under the poverty line
and 21 % in extreme poverty. However he took advantage
of his five year mandate to translate into action his
promise of alternative government.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF STATE POWER
Until 1991, Mali was governed under a constitution drawn
up in 1974 and made effective, with amendments, in 1979.
Elected twice without opposition, President Moussa Traoré
ruled from 1969 as a dictator, and from 1979 through the
nation’s sole legal political party, the Democratic
Union of the Malian People, founded in 1979. After a coup
in March 1991 deposed Traoré, this party was dissolved.
A new constitution, approved by popular referendum in
January 1992, established Mali as a multi-party republic
with a president directly elected to a five-year term.
There is a maximum of two terms for any President. The
president appoints the prime minister, who is the head
of the government and he selects the other members of
the council of ministers. Mali is divided into eight administrative
regions, sub divided into cercles (circles) and arrondissement
(districts) plus the Capital district of Bamako, the major
cities elected mayors and municipal councils. Bamako has
a governor as Head Office Administration. Each cercle
is administered by a “commandant” and each
arrondissement is “headed” by a chief of the
district.
The separation of powers is enshrined in the fundamental
law of the land-the Constitution. Legislative power resides
in the National Assembly. The unicameral National Assembly
consists of 120 deputies elected to five-year terms; 13
seats in the assembly are reserved to represent the interests
of Malians abroad. Article 81 of the constitution stipulates
that “the power of the Judiciary in independent
of the Legislative and the Executive”.
III. CONTEXT
For more than a decade, African countries in general and
those in West Africa in particular have been involved
in a renewal of democratic process. Also, in some of these
countries, great efforts are underway to organise free,
credible and transparent elections. Mali, a member state
of ECOWAS had April 2007 as deadline for general election
inline with the Supplementary Protocol on the Maintenance
of Peace and the Prevention of Conflicts signed in 1999
and its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
signed in 2001, ECOWAS has set itself the mission of assisting
member state which seems to organise free and transparent
elections, this assistance may take the form of technical
assistance, political mediation, financial assistance,
assistance in equipment or any other assistance which
may help the requesting state to organise the election
within the rules set in the above mentioned protocols.
A justification for an ECOWAS Exploratory Mission despatched
to Mali was the fact that the democratic process under
way in that country needed to be reinforced as in several
other countries in the sub region. Since Mali is one of
the countries in the sub region well known for its peaceful
democratic transition it was important that democratic
gains needed to be preserved there. It is for this reason
that the President of the ECOWAS Commission dispatched
a four-member pre-election Exploratory Mission to Mali
on 24 March 2007. The Mission was led by Mr. Amirou Garba
Sidikou, Secretary General of the Association of Traditional
Chiefs of Niger who is also a member of the ECOWAS Council
of the Wise. Other members of the mission were the former
Chairman of the Autonomous Electoral Commission of the
Benin, the Head of Zone 2 bureau based in Burkina Faso
and Electoral Programme Assistance Officer of ECOWAS.
The goal of this Exploratory Mission was to make sure
that the impending election of Mali was been prepared
in condition of peace and transparency in Mali.
· The Stakes
Since 2002, the date of the first election which brought
into office President Amadou Toumani Touré, the
Political consensus which has prevail in Mali seems to
be given way to a state of an easy disquiet: there also
seems to be no real political opposition. This has come
about because all the major parties have one time or the
other be represented in the government of the President’s
movement led by Prime Minister Issoufou Maiga.
This had some implications for the 29 April 2007 Election
such that divergent attitudes could play out: a scission
of l’ADEMA gave birth to Convergence 2007 and to
the candidature of Soumeyloy Boubey Maiga.
Ibrahim Boubakar Keita, president of the national Assembly
and leader of RPM, who has always shown independent tendencies
of opinion and action also declared his candidature nd
this was predicted.
Tiebile Drame, one of the foremost leader ATT, implied
a malicious outburst during the Franco-African Summit
in Bamako that he had become a victim of a plot and so
was quitting the president Camp and also announced it
candidature.
In view of the above mentioned, it became obvious that
some of the consequences of the presidential election
would be that political consensus risked being fragmented.
One could expect a return to the classical scheme of things
where the majority which governs is confronted by uncompromising
opposition which opposes within the framework of laws
and regulations and which knows its rights. To this end,
it was important that the parties which were still in
alliance with the President had to redouble their dynamism
and show some prove of their independent if there were
to survive credible puplic opinion: in effect it could
not be rolled out that the Citizens’ Movement which
is the principal spot of H.E. President Touré with
it own social agenda. An so the parties in alliance with
the President could show him open support while still
being critical of President Touré so as to secure
their future.
To all intents and purposes, when a President relies
simply on his popularity and charisma to govern without
a political party it is a sure replica for disaster. This
case is similar to previous scenario which swept the President
to power. As that time as it is now the political culture
prevailing was that he was God sent; but this has weaken
the role of political parties in respect of the population’s
aspirations.
In the cause of the Mission’s stay in Mali form
24 March to 2 April 2007, the delegation met different
key stakeholders of the electoral process.
The Mission evaluated the state of preparations towards
elections and during it stay, the mission noted a number
of key issues notably:
- The general atmosphere prevailing the country
- The voter database and voter ID cards
- The voters register
- Institutions regulating communication
- Incumbency and the abusive use of State Power
· The General Atmosphere
This pre-electoral register was characterised by a lurking
anxiety regarding the pending election which people looked
forward to with happiness. The leaders of political parties
as well as those of civil society did not hesitate to
predict the breakout of violence if the election takes
place with guarantees of transparency and a change in
the noticeable illegal behaviour of the Malian authorities.
It was in the same vein that the Bishop Conference of
Mali published a letter entitled “and how are we
restoring Politics? In this letter they regretted the
practical decline of morals and called on the political
class once again seize the opportunity. On their part,
Muslim leaders many times prayed and preached in the mosque
for avoidance of violence with this mentality prevailing,
several questions were raised touching on the following
points:
- The voter data-base and voter ID cards.
Seven million and two hundred thousand voter ID cards
had been printed when there was a total of 6.884.524 voters.
In spite of the | 
